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Constitutional rights without rellledies: 
judicial review of underinclusive legislation 
When a law treats differentially groups that ought to be treated identically, courts can 
invalidate the statute or expand it to include the formerly excluded. The result, the 
authors say, can be the affirmation of a right-without a remedy for the plaintiff. 
By Bruce K. Miller and Neal E. Devins 
0 n the face of it, the recent decisions of People v. Li-berta1 from the New York Court of Appeals, and Heck-
ler v. Mathews2 from the United States 
Supreme Court, have nothing in com-
mon. One is a rape appeal, the other a 
Social Security case; one is a landmark, 
rightly celebrated in the popular press,3 
the other a doctrinally insignificant ap-
proval of a temporary statute that has 
already expired; one is expansive in its 
reading of the equal protection guaran-
tee, the other cautious, consolidating in 
tone. Liberta and Mathews converge 
only in their similar treatment of the 
apparently mundane question of how a 
court ought to go about remedying an 
impermissibly underinclusive statutory 
classification, that is, a law which treats 
differently people or groups which ought 
to be treated the same. By approaching 
this question in a manner that ignores 
the realities of the litigation process, the 
two decisions have together articulated a 
doctrine that threatens our most funda-
mental assumptions about judicial re-
view in constitutional cases. 
Substantial portions of the discussion of Heckler v. 
Mathews in this essay are drawn from a previously 
published article by one of the authors. Miller, Con-
stitutional Remedies for Underinclusive Statutes, 
20HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 79(1985). The editors of 
that journal have graciously consented to the au-
thors' republication of excerpts from that article. 
I. 64 N.Y.2d 152, 485 N.Y.S. 207 (1984). 
2. 465 u.s. 728 (1984). 
3. N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 1984, at I. 
4. N.Y. Penal Law §§130.00, subd. 4, 130.35 
(McKinney 1984). 
5. 64 N.Y.2d at 164, 485 N.Y.S. at 213. 
6. Jd. at 170,485 N.Y.S. at 218. 
7. Jd. at 171,485 N.Y.S. at 218. 
8. Id. at 171-72, 485 N.Y.S. at 218. 
9. Id. at 172, 485 N.Y.S. at 219. 
10. 42 U.S.C. §§402(b), (c), (e), (f) (1982). 
II. 430 U.S. 199 (1977). 
People u Liberta 
Untill984, a New York statute4 exempted 
from prosecution husbands who raped 
their wives if the spouses were living 
together at the time of the rape. Because 
Mario Liberta was not living with his 
wife when he sexually assaulted her in 
1981, he was prosecuted and convicted of 
raping her. He appealed his conviction, 
arguing that the marital exemption was 
unconstitutional and that New York's 
rape statute could not therefore be en-
forced against him. 
In a unanimous, landmark decision, 
the New York Court of Appeals agreed 
with Mr. Liberta that the marital rape 
exemption was invalid. Judge (now 
Chief Judge) Wachtler's opinion for the 
court affirmed the right of a married 
woman to control her body,5 thereby 
underscoring the willingness of our judi-
ciary to protect an indispensable condi-
tion of human freedom. In this respect, 
the decision honors the most basic aspi-
rations of our legal system. 
But after holding the marital exemp-
tion unconstitutional, the court of ap-
peals nonetheless allowed Mario Liber-
ta's rape conviction to stand. Proceeding 
from the premise that "when a statute is 
constitutionally defective because of un-
derinclusion, a court may either strike the 
statute, and thus make it applicable to 
nobody, or extend the coverage of the sta-
tute to those formerly excluded,"6 Judge 
Wachtler saw the court's remedial task as 
"to discern what course the legislature 
would have chosen to follow if it had 
foreseen our conclusions as to underincl u-
siveness."7 Not at all surprisingly, "the 
inevitable conclusion [was] that the legis-
lative would prefer to eliminate the [ mari-
tal] exemptions and thereby preserve the 
[rape] statutes."8 Accordingly, since the 
statutes under which Mr. Liberta "was 
convicted [were] not being struck down, 
his conviction"9 was affirmed. 
Heckler u Mathews 
The Social Security Act has long pro-
vided spousal benefits for the wives, 
husbands, widows, and widowers of re-
tired and disabled wage earners. Spousal 
benefits are based on the earnings of the 
retired or disabled wage earner.10 Prior to 
December, 1977, the Act demanded that 
men seeking spousal benefits demon-
state dependency on their wage-earner 
wives for one half of their support. 
Women, on the other hand, could qual-
ify for benefits without having to make a 
similar demonstration of dependency on 
their husbands. 
In March, 1977, the Supreme Court, in 
Califano v. Goldfarb,u held this gender-
based dependency test unconstitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. The Court concluded 
that the male-only dependency test re-
sulted in the work of females (whose hus-
bands had to prove dependency) provid-
ing less protection to their families in the 
form of benefits than the work of males 
(whose wives automatically received the 
government pension). To eliminate this 
inequity, the Court invalidated the male-
only proof-of-dependency requirement. 
In response to this decision, Congress, 
in December, 1977, amended the Social 
Security Act. First, Congress eliminated 
the male-only dependency test. Second, 
Congress enacted a "pension offset" pro-
vision which required that spousal bene-
fits be reduced by federal/state govern-
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ment pensions. This offset provision 
was designed to rectify the substantial 
increase in Social Security payments 
caused by the elimination of the depen-
dency test. Third, apparently concerned 
about the effect of the new offset provi-
sions on those persons (women and men 
who could prove dependency) who had 
planned their retirements on the assump-
tion that they would receive full unre-
duced spousal benefits, Congress chose 
to exclude this group of individuals 
from the pension offset requirement for 
a five-year grace period. In order to effec-
tuate this result, Congress incorporated 
into the offset exception the dependency 
test found unconstitutional in Goldfarb. 
Fourth, Congress, recognizing that the 
dependency test might be invalidated, 
included a severability clause in the leg-
islation. This provision would have nul-
lified the "pension offset" exception, if 
the dependency test were found uncon-
stitutional in this context.12 
After retiring from his job with the 
Post Office, RobertMathews applied for 
Social Security husbands' benefits under 
the 1977 Amendment on the basis of his 
wife's earnings record. But because he 
could not satisfy the pre-Goldfarb depen-
dency test, Mathews' Social Security en-
titlement was entirely offset by his fed-
eral pension. He then filed a lawsuit 
challenging the constitutionality of both 
the "pension offset" exception and the 
severability clause. Mathews maintained 
that the offset exception was an improper 
reenactment of the gender classification 
held unconstitutional in Califano v. 
Goldfarb. His challenge to the severabil-
ity clause had two elements. First, the 
severability clause, by nullifying rather 
than extending the offset exception, de-
nied him an adequate remedy for an 
unconstitutionally inflicted injury. In 
other words, "men [could] vindicate their 
constitutional right to equal protection 
only be causing others to forfeit benefits 
they have been previously entitled to."U 
Second, the severability clause was an 
improper curtailment of federal court 
jurisdiction, since by prohibiting a re-
viewing court from granting adequate 
relief to Mathews, it in effect eliminated 
his standing to maintain the suit. 14 
The Supreme Court unanimously re-
jected both arguments. The severability 
clause, according to Justice Brennan's 
opinion for the Court, did not under-
mine Mathews' standing to sue and 
thereby threaten the Court's power to 
correct constitutional violations, because 
the right claimed by Mathews was not 
the right to Social Security benefits but 
rather the right to a benefit distribution 
scheme that was free of unconstitutional 
gender discrimination.15 
Like the New York Court of Appeals 
in People v. Liberta, Justice Brennan 
pointed out that a court which sustains a 
claim of unconstitutional underinclu-
siveness "faces 'two remedial alterna-
tives: [it] may either declare [the statute] 
a nullity and order that its benefits not 
extend to the class that the legislature 
intended to benefit or it may extend the 
coverage of the statute to include those 
who are aggrieved by the exclusion.' " 16 
A court should not, however, make this 
choice in a way that "circumvent(s] the 
intent of the legislature. " 17 Because the 
severability clause clearly expressed Con-
gress' "preference for nullification rather 
than extension of the pension offset 
exception in the event it is found inval-
id,"18 the proper remedy was obvious. 
That remedy did not, however, have to be 
implemented in Mr. Mathews' case be-
cause of Justice Brennan's finding that 
the pension offset exception did not vio-
late the equal protection guarantee. The 
temporary reenactment of the pre-Gold-
farb classification was permissible be-
cause it was substantially related to the 
goal of protecting the reliance interests 
of those who expected to receive benefits 
under the pre-Goldfarb rules. 19 
Impact on judicial review 
The Liberta and Mathews decisions are 
two prominent recent examples of a dis-
turbing willingness of our most presti-
gious courts to entertain constitutional 
challenges to statutes without granting 
relief to the litigants who brought those 
challenges forward. The remedial ap-
12. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. 
No. 95-216, §§3!H(a)(2), (b)(l), (b)(2), (d)(l), (f), (g), 
42 U.S.C. §§402(b)(4)(A), (c)(l)(C), (c)(2)(A), 
(h)(l)(D),(n). 
13. Appellee's Brief at 42, Heckler v. Mathews, 
104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984). 
14. Mathews v. Heckler, 1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. 
(CCH) 1jl4,313 at 2408 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 24, 1982), 
rev'd, 104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984). The district court sus-
tained both of Mathews' arguments, holding the 
offset exception unconstitutional and then labeling 
the severability provision as an "adroit attempt to 
discourage the bringing of an action by destroying 
standing." The clause sought to "mandate the out-
come of any challenge to the validity of the [pen-
sion offset] exception by making such a challenge 
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proach taken in the two cases is most 
visibly troubling because it moves the 
courts away from their traditional and 
most important role as arbiters of con-
crete disputes. The New York Court of 
Appeals used Liberta's appeal as the oc-
casion to end New York's marital rape 
exemption, but its decision had no bear-
ing on whether his rape conviction stood 
or fell. Similarly, the Supreme Court 
used Mathews' claim for Social Security 
benefits as the vehicle for resolving the 
constitutionality of the pension offset ex-
ception, but the resolution did not affect 
his entitlement to the benefits he sought. 
But on another level, one step removed 
from the immediate interests of Liberta 
and Mathews, the decisions are even 
more disquieting. If taken seriously as a 
guide to lower court judges on how to 
think about remedying unconstitution-
ally underinclusive classifications, Li-
berta and Mathews could quickly crip-
ple the process that brings such classifica-
tions to light. 
It is a truism of our adversarial judi-
cial system that courts do not declare 
statutes unconstitutional on their own 
initiative. They act only when asked to 
do so by a person claiming to be harmed 
by such a statute.20 Thus the question of 
the constitutionality of New York's mar-
ital rape exemption was before the court 
only because Liberta, or, more precisely, 
his lawyer, Barbara Howe of the Buffalo 
Legal Aid Society, raised the issue. 
Howe argued that because New York's 
rape law arbitrarily exempted some hus-
bands, but not Liberta, from prosecu-
tion for raping their wives, the statute 
violated the constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection of the laws. Because the 
rape statute was invalid, she contended, 
Liberta could not properly be convicted 
under it. 
Howe did not challenge the marital 
rape exemption in order to reform the 
fruitless. This kind of 'in terrorem' approach insu-
lates the legislative work product from judicial 
review, in violation of the doctrine of separation of 
powers." It was therefore "an unconstitutional 
usurpation of judicial power." I d. 
15. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 737 (1984). 
16. Id. at 738. 
17. ld. at 739, n.5 (quoting Califano v. Westcott, 
443 U.S. 76, 93-94 (Powell, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)). 
lB./d. 
19. ld. at 744-51. 
20. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, 454 U.S. 464,484 (1982). 
law, to assure that husbands who rape 
their wives be brought to justice, or to 
protect the autonomy and bodily integ-
rity of married women. Rather, as a 
properly diligent criminal defense attor-
ney, she was doing her best to secure the 
reversal of her client's conviction. By 
voiding the marital exemption while at 
the same time affirming Liberta's con-
viction for rape, the court of appeals 
assured that Howe won the battle but 
lost the war. 
It may be tempting at first glance to 
view this outcome as justice triumphant. 
The court's judgment both assures that a 
rapist receives the punishment he de-
serves and removes an oppressive anach-
ronism from the statute books. But we 
cannot long have it both ways. The court 
of appeals' message to lawyers such as 
Howe is, in effect, "Don't bother chal-
lenging unconstitutionally narrow crim-
inallaws. You may be right, but it won't 
do your client any good. Because of pub-
lic policy and legislative intent favoring 
punishment of the guilty, his conviction 
will stand anyway." The simple fact is 
that if it does the client no good, if the 
conviction stands anyway, the lawyer 
will not assert the claim. And in the case 
of a criminal statute, if the defense attor-
ney does not raise a constitutional claim, 
there is no one else in our system of jus-
tice who will, because there is no one else 
who can. 
Neither a victim of marital rape, nor 
the government, acting as prosecutor in 
her behalf, could have done anything to 
prompt judicial review of the marital 
exemption. Any attempt to prosecute a 
husband for raping his wife without a 
statute making that act a crime would 
quickly (and properly) have been re-
buffed as a violation of due process and 
of the constitutional prohibition of ex 
post facto Jaws. 21 In short, we depend on 
lawyers such as Howe to point up the 
21. U.S. Const., art I, §9, cl. 3. 
22. The constitutionality of the pension offset 
exception was challenged in seven cases, all but one 
filed prose. Webb v. Schweiker, 701 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 
1983), cert. granted, vacated and remanded for con-
sideration in light of Heckler v. Mathews sub nom. 
Heckler v. Webb, 104 S.Ct. 1583 (1984); Rosofsky v. 
Schweiker, 523 F.Supp. 1180 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), prob. 
juris. noted, 456 U.S. 959, appeal dismissed, 457 
U.S. 1141 (1982); Miller v. Dep't of Health and 
Human Services, 517 F.Supp. 1192 (E.D.N. Y. 1981 ); 
Caloger v. Harris, 1981 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) 
~17,754 (D. Md. Mar. 25, 1981); Duffy v. Harris,I979 
Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ~ 16,906 (D.N .M. Oct. 23, 
1979); Wachtell v. Schweiker, No. 80-8022 (S.D. Fla. 
constitutional flaws in our statutory law, 
or we depend on no one. 
For Mathews, the stakes are certainly 
Jess serious than for Liberta, but the prin-
ciple is exactly the same. So long as the 
pension offset exemption nullification 
clause is enforceable, Mathews and his 
lawyers know that a lawsuit challenging 
the exception as unconstitutional holds 
no promise of securing the Social Secur-
ity benefits he seeks. He can vindicate his 
constitutional right to equal treatment 
only by causing other, wholly innocent, 
female recipients of Social Security 
spouse's benefits to forfeit their entitle-
ments. Few men in Mathews' position 
will be so committed to the abstract 
principle of gender equality or so cal-
lous about the consequences of a consti-
tutional "victory" to challenge the offset 
exception in the face of these realities. 
Even fewer lawyers will be anxious to 
litigate claims which hold no promise of 
tangible return to their clients.22 
The Liberta and Mathews courts obvi-
ously did not intend their decisions to 
obstruct access to judicial review. Rather, 
in their zeal to defer to legislative reme-
dial preferences and, in Liberta at least, 
to fashion the most obviously just long-
term result, both courts neglected a first 
principle of American Jaw: at least where 
the Constitution is concerned, if there's a 
right, there's a remedy. 
The importance of this principle is 
underscored if we assume its opposite-
that the Mathews and Liberta courts 
were correct in denying a meaningful 
remedy to the litigants before them. 
Under this assumption, there is substan-
tial reason to doubt whether the proper 
conditions for adjudicating a constitu-
tional challenge were met in either case. 
Perhaps, contrary to Justice Brennan's 
view, neither Mathews nor Liberta had 
standing to raise his claim. In any event, 
by failing to address the harms suffered 
jan. 26, 1982), appeal filed, No. 82-5552 (lith Cir. 
Apr. 30, 1982). The single case in which the plaintiff 
was represented by counsel was Mathews v. Heckler, 
1982 Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH) ~14,313 (N.D. Ala. 
Aug. 24, 1982), rev'd 104 S.Ct. 1387 (1984), where,of 
course, the constitutionality of the severability 
clause was also challenged. 
23. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). 
24. 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries, •23, •)09. 
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 
163 (1803). 
26. 327 u.s. 678 (1946). 
27. /d. at 684. 
28. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 
u.s. 579 (1952). 
by the parties, both decisions begin tore-
semble advisory opinions more than 
adjudications of real controversies. 
Right to a remedy 
The roots of the proposition that the 
fashioning of a remedy for a constitu-
tional wrong is essential to the process of 
judicial review can be traced at least as 
far back as Blackstone and, through 
him, to Marbury v. Madison. 23 In the 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
Blackstone wrote: 
It is a general and indisputable rule, that 
where there is a legal right, there is also a 
legal remedy by suit, or action at law, when-
ever that right is invaded .... It is a settled 
and invariable principle in the laws of 
England, that every right, when withheld, 
must have a remedy, and every injury its 
proper redress. 24 
In a similar vein, Chief Justice Mar-
shall wrote in Marbury: 
The very essence of civil liberty lies in the 
right of the individual to claim the protec-
tion of the laws whenever he receives an 
injury .... The government of the United 
States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws and not of men. It will 
certainly cease to observe this high appel-
lation if the laws furnish no remedy for the 
violation of a vested legal right.25 
More recently, the Supreme Court's 
landmark 1946 decision in Bell v. H ood26 
underscored the centrality of a court's 
remedial power to the exercise of the 
judicial function. In holding that a 
damage action against FBI officers for 
violations of the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments was within the federal 
question jurisdiction granted to district 
courts, the Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Black, noted that: 
It is established practice for this Court to 
sustain the jurisdiction of federal courts to 
issue injunctions to protect rights safe-
guarded by the Constitution and to re-
strain individual state officers from doing 
what the Fourteenth Amendment forbids 
the state to do. Moreover, where federally 
protected rights have been invaded, it has 
been the rule from the beginning that 
courts will be alert to adjust their remedies 
to grant the necessary relief. And it is also 
well settled that where legal rights have 
been invaded and a federal statute provides 
for a central right to sue for that invasion, 
federal courts may use any available remedy 
to make good the wrong done.27 
Six years later, in the Steel Seizure case, 28 
the Court applied these principles to 
sustain a district court's issuance of a 
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preliminary injunction restraining en-
forcement of President Truman's order 
directing the Secretary of Commerce to 
take control of most of the nation's steel 
mills. The Court based its affirmance on 
its finding that "equity's extraordinary 
... relief"29 was the only means of assur-
ing the threatened companies an ade-
quate remedy for unconstitutionally in-
flicted injuries, despite the gravity of its 
interference with the conduct of execu-
tive power in time of war. 
Similarly, school desegregation litiga-
tion since the Supreme Court's second 
Brown decision30 has centered largely on 
remedial issues and has been premised 
on the idea that the constitutional right 
to be free from officially imposed racial 
segregation includes an adequate remedy 
for the injury such separation inflicts. In 
Green v. New Kent County School Board, 
for example, the Court invalidated inef-
fective, voluntary freedom-of-choice 
plans and demanded that school boards 
come forward with a plan "that prom-
ises realistically to work now. " 31 Three 
years later, in Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg County Board of Education,32 
the Court upheld the use of mandatory 
busing as a desegregation remedy, ac-
knowledging that in order to eliminate 
all vestiges of an unconstitutional dual 
school system, the necessary remedies 
may be "administratively awkward, in-
convenient, and even bizarre. "33 
The proposition that vindication of a 
constitutional right includes an ade-
quate remedy has been confirmed more 
recently by the Supreme Court's line of 
decisions, beginning with Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal 
Bureau of Narcotics, 34 grounding the 
availability of an adequate remedy for 
constitutional violation in the Article III 
powers of the federal courts. In Bivens, 
the Court sustained a claim for damages 
against federal agents for injuries caused 
by a warrantless arrest and search in vio-
lation of the Fourth Amendment. There 
was no federal statute authorizing such a 
claim. Nevertheless, the damage award 
was properly within the power of a fed-
eral court, because of the principle an-
nounced in Bell v. Hood, i.e., that "where 
legal rights have been invaded ... courts 
will ... grant the necessary relief. "35 The 
Court then emphasized that an effective 
remedy was inherent in the protection 
afforded by the Fourth Amendment: 
From the earliest days 
of the republic, it 
has been fundamental 
that an injured person 
is entitled to relief 
from that injury. 
[W]e cannot accept respondents' formula-
tion of the question as whether the availa-
bility of money damages is necessary to 
enforce the Founh Amendment. For we 
have here no explicit congressional decla-
ration that persons injured by a federal 
officer's violation of the Founh Amend-
ment may not recover damages from the 
agents, but must instead be remitted to 
another remedy, equally effective in the 
eyes of Congress.36 
Bivens thus acknowledges the primary 
responsibility of Congress over remedies 
for injuries inflicted by the unconstitu-
tional conduct of federal officials, but 
also underscores the power of the federal 
courts to afford constitutionally suffi-
cient relief in the event Congress fails to 
carry out that responsibility.37 
The duty of the federal courts to pro-
vide relief for unconstitutional injuries 
is in no way incompatible with a broad 
reading of Congress' power, under the 
"exceptions" clause of Article III of the 
Constitution, to regulate the subject mat-
ter jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Even if the exceptions power authorizes 
29. /d. at 384. 
30. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 
(1955). 
31. 391 u.s. 430, 439 (1968). 
32. 402 U.S. I (1971). 
33. ld. at 28. 
34. 403 u.s. 388 (1971). 
35. 327 U.S. at 684. 
36. 403 U.S. at 397. 
37. The Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Biv-
ens principle on three occasions since announcing 
it in 1971. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) 
(authorizing damage remedy for congressional staff 
member unconstitutionally discharged on the basis 
of gender); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) 
(authorizing damage claim for parent of federal 
prisoner whose death was caused by official failure 
to provide medical care); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 
367 ( 1983) (affirming dismissal of federal employee's 
damage claim for violation of First Amendment 
rights, on ground that remedies provided by civil 
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Congress to exempt particular classes of 
constitutional claims from federal re-
view, it cannot, consistent with the sepa-
ration of governmental powers, be read 
to permit Congress formally to grant the 
power of review over such claims while, 
at the same time, withdrawing the au-
thority of a reviewing court to provide 
relief to the injured claimant. As Profes-
sor Laurence H. Tribe has pointed out: 
Congress may not so truncate the jurisdic-
tion of an Article III court as to empower it 
to 'decide' a legal controversy while denying 
it any means to effectuate its. decision .... 
Congress' broad authority to regulate the 
panoply of available remedies, in other 
words, stops short of the power to reduce an 
Article III court to a disarmed, disembodied 
oracle of the law lacking all capacity to give 
tangible meaning to its decisions.3B 
If the federal courts are required to 
provide adequate remedies for the viola-
tion of constitutional rights, the duties 
of the state courts, under the supremacy 
clause, cannot be any less. Nearly 40 
years have passed since the Supreme 
Court confirmed, in Testa v. Katt, 39 the 
general obligation of state courts to 
enforce federal constitutional rights vio-
lated by state policies or statutes. And 
long before Testa, it was clear that such 
enforcement entailed a duty to provide a 
constitutionally sufficient remedy for 
injuries caused by the violation.4° From 
the earliest days of the republic, then, a 
fundamental assumption of our legal 
order has been the proposition that a 
person injured by unconstitutional gov-
ernment action is entitled to judicial 
relief from that injury. 41 
A crucial distinction 
Judge Wachtler's opinion for the New 
York Court of Appeals in Liberta did not 
address the question of Liberta's right to 
service commission regulation were constitution-
ally adequate). 
38. Tribe, jurisdictional Gerrymandering: Zon-
ing Disfavored Rights Out of the Federal Courts, 16 
Harv. C. R.-C.L.L. Rev. 129 (1981). 
39. 330 u.s. 386 (1947). 
40. See, e.g., Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Ben-
nett, 284 U.S. 239 ( 1931 ); Ward v. Love County, 253 
U.S. 17 ( 1920); General Oil Company v. Crain, 209 
u.s. 211 (1908). 
41. The general availability of a sovereign im-
munity defense to unauthorized damage suits 
against federal and state governments does not 
undercut this principle. In situations where sover-
eign immunity precludes an award of monetary 
relief, the power of the federal courts to provide 
constitutionally adequate alternative remedies be-
comes an integral element of the "paramount 
authority of the Federal Constitution." Sterling v. 
Constantin, 387 U.S. 378, 397-98 (1932); see also, 
General Oil v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 236 (1908). 
a remedy. Presumably, this omission was 
prompted by Liberta's unambiguous 
guilt of the act of rape, regardless of the 
constitutionality of the marital rape ex-
emption. But Liberta's guilt does not 
alter the fact that in the case before the 
court of appeals, the appeal of his con-
viction, it was he and only he who was 
injured by the exemption. Unless his 
injury can fairly be described as some-
thing other than the conviction itself, 
there is no escaping the conclusion that 
the court failed to perform its constitu-
tional duty to provide him a remedy. 
Justice Brennan, on the other hand, 
did consider Mathews' right to a remedy. 
He found, however, that Mathews' right 
could be satisfied equally by either exten-
sion or nullification of the pension off-
set exception. The reason either remedy 
was equally effective was that in Bren-
nan's view, the injury suffered by 
Mathews was not the denial of the Social 
Security benefits he sought, but was 
instead the gender "discrimination it-
sel£."42 Such discrimination, 
by perpetuating 'archaic and stereotypic 
notions' or by stigmatizing members of the 
disfavored group as 'innately inferior' and 
therefore as less worthy participants in the 
political community ... can cause serious 
non-economic injuries to those persons 
who are personally denied equal treatment 
solely because of their membership in a 
disfavored group.43 
An adequate remedy for this injury could, 
of course, "be accomplished by with-
drawal of benefits for the favored class as 
well as by the extension of benefits to the 
excluded class. "44 
This equation of the injury caused 
Mathews by the pension offset exception 
with the possible unconstitutionality of 
the exception itself is, however, a trans-
parent fiction. Its transparency is re-
vealed by applying Brennan's metho-
dology in Mathews to Liberta's appeal. 
For Brennan, the injury suffered by 
Liberta would not be his rape convic-
42. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, at 739. 
43. /d. at 739-40. 
44. /d. at 740. 
45. ld. at 739. 
46. 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970). Both the Mathews 
and Liberia opinions invoke Justice Harlan's Welsh 
concurrence as the starting point for their remedial 
analysis. Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. at 738; Peo-
ple v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 170,485 N.Y.S. at 218. 
47. ld. at 337. 
48. 50 U.S.C. app. §456(-) (Supp. IV 1964); 
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 336. 
49. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 341-43. 
50. I d. at 356 (Harlan, J., concurring in result). 
tion, but rather the New York legisla-
ture's denial of his right to a statute crim-
inalizing rape that is free of irrational 
distinctions based on the marital rela-
tionship of the victim and perpetrator. 
Such distinctions themselves, by "perpe-
tuating archaic notions" and "stigmat-
izing members of the disfavored group"45 
cause serious injuries to the members of 
that group. 
To describe Liberta's injury in this 
way is, of course, absurd. It is married 
women raped by their husbands, not 
rapists who are not married to their vic-
tims, who are stigmatized by the marital 
rape exemption and thereby labeled as 
less worthy participants in the political 
community. This dehumanization of 
women because they are married is the 
reason why the marital exemption was 
rightly eliminated by the Liberta court, 
but it is not, in any sense, the injury 
which prompted Liberta's appeal. That 
injury remains his conviction for the 
crime of rape. 
The inadequacy of Brennan's charac-
terization of Mathews' injury is con-
firmed by the opinion that provided the 
foundation for the remedial dispositions 
in both Mathews and Liberta: Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion in Welsh v. 
United States. 46 Welsh concerned an ap-
peal from a criminal conviction by a con-
scientious objector whose opposition to 
war was based on ethical beliefs of a secu-
lar rather than a religious nature.47 The 
statute authorizing exemption from mil-
itary service for conscientious objectors 
had been construed by selective service 
officials to limit objector status to those 
whose opposition to war was grounded 
in formal religious training and belief. 48 
A majority of the Supreme Court rejected 
this construction and reversed Welsh's 
conviction on the ground that the statute 
was broad enought to encompass his eth-
ically rooted, but not traditionally reli-
gious, conscientious scruples.49 Harlan 
51. ld. at 301. 
52. !d. at 362-63. 
53. Welsh was, of course, a criminal appeal. It 
might, for this reason, be argued that Justice Har-
lan's concurring opinion, while supporting Liber-
ta's argument for reversal of his conviction, is of no 
help in Heckler v. Mathews, a civil case. But the 
proposition that a reviewing court's task is not 
complete until it has remedied the injury caused by 
an unconstitutional governmental action has long 
been commonplace in civil cases. See, e.g., Iowa-
Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239, 
247 (1931). 
could not accept the majority's reading of 
the statute and was thus compelled to 
reach the constitutional issue, which he 
resolved by finding that the statutory dis-
tinction between religious and secular 
beliefs amounted to an unconstitutional 
establishment of religion, in violation of 
the First Amendment. so 
Harlan's disposition of the merits of 
Welsh's appeal forced him to address the 
question of the appropriate constitu-
tional remedy. He began by stating the 
proposition that was to serve as the start-
ing point for both Judge Wachtler in 
Liberta and Justice Brennan in Mathews: 
Where a statute is defective because of 
underinclusion, there exist two remedial 
alternatives; a court may either declare [the 
statute] a nullity and order that its benefits 
not extend to the class that the legislature 
intended to benefit, or it may extend the 
coverage of the statute to include those 
who are aggrieved by the exclusion.5 ' 
The unconstitutionality of Welsh's in-
jury could plainly have been remedied 
by nullifying the exemption granted to 
religious objectors. Nevertheless, nulli-
fication was, in Harlan's view, inade-
quate as a constitutional remedy. The 
reason was that while nullification 
would correct the unconstitutionality of 
statutory exemption scheme, it would 
not touch the injury suffered by Welsh-
the conviction for refusing induction 
and corresponding prison sentence. This 
injury could be redressed only by extend-
ing the benefit of conscientious objec-
tion to Welsh and others whose moral 
opposition to participation in war was 
grounded in secular rather than reli-
gious belie£.52 
The distinction is a critical one: When 
confronted with an injury that is created 
by an unconstitutionally underinclusive 
statutory classification, the responsibil-
ity of a federal court is not simply to 
correct the unconstitutionality but to 
remedy the injury. In Liberta's case, this 
means reversing the conviction. In 
Mathews', it means directing payment of 
his Social Security benefits.s3 
Costs of a remedy 
If, as we have argued, the non-remedies 
dispensed by the Mathews and Liberta 
courts indeed threaten the tradition of 
judicial review of unconstitutional gov-
ernment action, it is only fair that we 
acknowledge the far from trivial conse-
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quences of our belief that the only justif-
iable decisions were extension of Social 
Security benefits in Mathews and nulli-
fication of New York's rape statutes in 
their entirety in Liberta. Mathews is, of 
course, the easier case. Congress obvi-
ously would retain the authority to re-
spond to a Supreme Court decision ex-
tending the pension offset exception to 
Mathews by prospectively repealing the 
exception entirely. Such a prospective 
repeal would neither interfere with a 
reviewing court's ability to grant relief to 
the litigants before it nor obstruct access 
to judicial review by foreclosing any 
relief in advance of the filing of a lawsuit. 
Paradoxically, it is at least possible 
that a decision to disregard the Mathews 
severability clause would entail very lit-
tle intrusion on the legitimate exercise of 
legislative power. Though the legisla-
tive history is silent on the point, it is not 
unreasonable to assume that any mem-
ber of Congress who considered the 
likely impact of the clause would have 
seen that its most immediate and predic-
table effect would be to stifle the incen-
tive-and possibly the standing-of men 
denied benefits because of the underin-
clusiveness to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the sex discrimination ef-
fected by the exception. Such a disincen-
tive would thus work to assure that the 
harsh remedial option-nullification of 
the exception-envisioned by the clause 
would never have to be invoked. 
Under these circumstances, it becomes . 
much more problematical to describe 
the severability clause, despite its facial 
clarity, as a reliable indication of C!Jn-
gress' remedial intention in the event the 
exception were declared unconstitu-
tional. The clause was, in a very real 
sense, purely hypothetical, in contrast 
to, for example, a repeal of the exception 
enacted after adjudication of its uncon-
stitutionality or a direction (regardless 
of when enacted) that the constitutional-
ity of the exception be assured by extend-
ing the benefits it confers. Each of these 
latter prescriptions takes seriously the 
legislature's primary role as a dispenser 
of constitutional remedies. The offset 
severability clause (along with other 
provisions like it, which purport to deny 
all remedies for constitutional injuries) 
may, on the other hand, quite plausibly 
be viewed as a legislative bluff. Bluffs of 
this sort should be called. The price, in 
terms of legislative prerogatives, is small, 
especially in light of the countervailing 
danger to the effective exercise of judi-
cial review. 
The short-term consequences of nulli-
fying New York's rape statutes are obvi-
ously more serious than those presented 
by a decision to disregard the Mathews 
severability clause. Judge Wachtler feared 
that a judicial invalidation of the govern-
ment's authority to prosecute rapists 
would have "catastrophic effects. "54 Not 
only would Liberta have to be released, 
but perhaps all persons ever arrested or 
convicted for rape in the state of New 
York might be entitled to dismissal of the 
charge or reversal of the conviction. 55 
It is at least conceivable, however, that 
the consequences of granting relief to 
Liberta might not have been so dire. The 
hiatus created by invalidating the rape 
statute would surely have been hastily 
repaired by the legislature. And United 
States Supreme Court precedents offer 
substantial leeway for limiting the ret-
roactive application of a constitutional 
principle in order to avoid reopening 
criminal convictions.56 
Even so, it would be unfair to minim-
ize the costs of reversing Liberta's convic-
tion. If New York's rape statute had been 
held to be unenforceable, prosecutions of 
men awaiting trial on charges of rape, 
many of them surely guilty, would have 
to have been dropped. Liberta himself, 
already found guilty of rape, would in-
deed have gone free. No one could respon-
sibly argue that these are consequences 
we should accept easily or blithely. 
But the price of allowing the guilty to 
go free is one our society has been will-
ing to pay before (most notably in the 
case of the rule excluding illegally se-
cured evidence from admission at trial)57 
in order to assure constitutional govern-
ment. We believe it is a price that should 
have been paid in the Liberta case. By 
affirming his conviction, the New York 
Court of Appeals undermined the only 
process that could have opened the way 
for its historic elimination of the marital 
rape exemption. If there are other uncon-
stitutionally underinclusive statutes bur-
ied in New York's criminal code, we 
wonder whether, after Liberta, they will 
reach the court's docket. 
Conclusion 
On the face of it, the remedial decisions 
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in People v. Liberta and Heckler v. 
Mathews may seem unobjectionable. In 
each case, the court approached the task 
of correcting an unconstitutionally un-
derinclusive statute by deferring to the 
presumed wishes of the enacting legisla-
ture. In each case, the legislative prefer-
ence was accurately gauged and unprob-
lematically applied. And in Liberta, 
where the court's remedial choice was 
actually carried out, the result-exten-
sion of liability for rape to all husbands 
-was plainly the only tolerable legisla-
tive policy choice. 
This appearance, however, is highly 
deceptive. The practical impact of Li-
berta and Mathews is to advise persons 
injured by unconstitutionally underin-
clusive statutes that corrective litigation 
cannot help them but can only harm 
others. This message effectively chokes 
off the litigation process and thereby 
threatens to immunize such statutes from 
judicial scrutiny. The remedial approach 
of the Liberta and Mathews courts con-
sequently undermines the power of 
courts to hear and decide constitutional 
claims, a result that is plainly inconsist-
ent with the traditional goal of limiting 
government through law. 
If this practical impediment is taken to 
mean that litigants such as Mathews and 
Liberta do not have standing to present 
their constitutional challenges, it will 
present a formal bar to adjudication as 
well. Many underinclusive statutes will 
be theoretically as well as practically im-
mune from challenge. The Liberta and 
Mathews decisions thus fail to mask a 
genuine dilemma: either there is a right 
to a constitutional remedy or the Consti-
tution does not really reach the issues the 
two cases purported to resolve. D 
54. People v. Liberta, 64 N.Y.2d at 171,485 
N.Y.S.2d at 218. 
55. I d. at 173, 485 N. Y.S.2d at 320. 
56. See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
(1965); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972); Grif-
fin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); johnson v. 
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 319 (1966); United States v. 
Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
57. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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